Delimitation is not an exercise in drawing electoral maps. It is a key process that determines how the citizens of India are represented in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies and also how political power is distributed among political parties, regions, and communities.
The problem with India’s present delimitation framework is that once the exercise is completed, there is no effective institutional forum to correct any illegality, arbitrariness, procedural breach, or jurisdictional excess before the new seat allocations and constituency boundaries become established. In a modern constitutional democracy, such a design cannot be justified.
Public debate on delimitation has so far centred mainly on whether the freeze on inter-State representation in the Lok Sabha, fixed at 1971 Census levels, should continue after the first post-2026 Census. A mechanical lifting of that freeze would punish with fewer Lok Sabha seats those States that faithfully implemented the national population policy, while rewarding those that failed to do so. That would be inequitable and perverse. But far less attention has been paid to an equally vital issue: the infirmity of the delimitation process itself.
There is no permanent institutional mechanism for implementing delimitation. Articles 82 and 170 of the Constitution provide that, after every census, the allocation of Lok Sabha seats among the States, the strength of State Legislative Assemblies, and the division of States into territorial constituencies shall be readjusted “by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law determine”.
Parliament gave effect to this mandate through successive Delimitation Acts of 1952, 1962, 1972, and 2002, each entrusting the exercise to an independent Delimitation Commission.
Under the Delimitation Acts (and even the unsuccessful Delimitation Bill, 2026), the Delimitation Commission’s orders acquire the force of law upon publication in the Gazette. They do not need approval from Parliament, State Legislatures, or even the Union Council of Ministers. While the orders must be presented to Parliament and State Legislatures, this is only a procedural requirement since these bodies cannot modify, reject, or return them for reconsideration.
These features are not constitutionally mandated. They are statutory choices consciously made and maintained through successive Delimitation Acts. Together with the bar on judicial interference in delimitation matters under Article 329(a), the existing system places delimitation inside a constitutional “black box”, insulating it from meaningful executive, legislative, and judicial scrutiny.
This insulation was historically defended as a safeguard against crude partisan manipulation and never-ending legal challenges. But there is a fundamental difference between finality and immunity from accountability.
Under the earlier Delimitation Acts, the commission had two judicial members appointed by the Union Government, each a serving or former judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court—with one nominated as Chairperson—and the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) as an ex officio member. MPs and MLAs, nominated by the respective Speakers, served as associate members with the commission but only in an advisory capacity and had no voting rights. The 1972 Act standardised this legislative association at 10 members for each State—5 MPs and 5 MLAs, subject to reduction if a State had fewer than 5 MPs.
The Delimitation Act, 2002, altered this composition. It provided for a Chairperson, appointed by the Union Government, who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court, and two ex officio members: the CEC or an Election Commissioner nominated by him, and the State Election Commissioner (SEC) of the State concerned. It retained the 10 associate members, namely 5 MPs and 5 MLAs, nominated by the respective Speakers but without voting or signing rights. The 2026 Bill broadly followed this model.
Judicial developments
Recent judicial developments have begun to temper the earlier absolutism. In Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar (2000), the Supreme Court held that courts should not interfere in elections but may intervene where judicial action assists the electoral process or corrects illegality without derailing it.
More notably, in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court clarified that Article 329(a) does not confer absolute immunity. Limited judicial review remains available to correct manifest arbitrariness, provided such intervention does not disrupt the electoral timetable.
This jurisprudence points in the right direction. But so vital a matter should not be left to case-by-case judicial improvisation. Article 329(a) should be amended to permit stage-sensitive judicial review before election notification, limited to jurisdictional error, breach of mandatory procedure, manifest arbitrariness, and constitutional violation. Once elections are formally notified, the bar on judicial interference should operate fully. This would preserve electoral continuity without extinguishing judicial review, which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
India needs to rethink the belief that insulating delimitation from political interference requires its complete exclusion from legislative and judicial scrutiny. Mature democracies show that independence in delimitation does not have to be at the cost of accountability.
Delimitation worldwide
The US: Electoral boundaries are generally drawn through State legislation or State-level redistricting commissions. Where a State constitution so provides, legislature-drawn maps may be subject to gubernatorial veto, overcoming which requires a legislative supermajority or judicial intervention. Federal courts review districting plans for population inequality, vote dilution, and racial gerrymandering, although partisan gerrymandering is left exclusively to State courts.
Canada: Federal constituencies are redrawn by independent electoral boundaries commissions, one for each Province. The federal Cabinet cannot alter or veto their maps. The commissions’ reports are tabled in the House of Commons and referred to a parliamentary committee, where MPs may file objections. The commissions must consider these objections, but final authority rests with them. The courts retain the power of judicial review under the Canadian Charter’s guarantee of effective representation. Provinces have separate redistribution laws and commissions, with varying arrangements for consultation, legislative involvement and judicial scrutiny.
Australia: This country follows a highly rule-bound model. Independent State committees and the Augmented Electoral Commission finalise redistributions entirely free from executive or parliamentary veto. Unlike India’s broad discretionary model, Australia’s process is governed by detailed statutory criteria, enrolment quotas, and projected population tolerances. Courts do not sit in appeal over boundary configurations, but judicial review remains available for jurisdictional error, constitutional breach, or serious procedural non-compliance.
Germany and Japan: Both nations follow an advisory-legislative model. Expert commissions guide the process, but electoral boundaries acquire legal force only through parliamentary enactment. In both systems, courts have the power to review malapportionment and enforce constitutional equality.
Justice Kurian Joseph committee
Recognising the need to make Delimitation Commissions both independent and accountable, the Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union-State Relations, constituted by the government of Tamil Nadu in 2025, of which this author is a member, recommended amendments to Articles 82, 170, and 329(a) to introduce meaningful safeguards.
Drawing on Canada’s “dialogue model”, the committee proposed that draft delimitation orders be placed before the Lok Sabha and State Legislatures for time-bound scrutiny by designated legislative committees. Their remit should be confined to legality, demographic coherence, and statutory compliance.
These committees would collate valid objections and transmit them to the Delimitation Commission, which must consider them and publish a point-by-point, reasoned “Report on Objections”.
Legislatures must have a voice, not a veto; the commission must answer objections but need not always accept them. After a fixed 60-day interval, the final orders would be gazetted and acquire the force of law. Pending constitutional amendments to Articles 82 and 170, Parliament should incorporate this dialogue model (legislative scrutiny and reasoned responses) in any new delimitation law. The failed Delimitation Bill, 2026, missed this opportunity.
The Kurian Joseph Committee also recommended amending Article 329(a) to permit judicial review of final delimitation orders before elections are notified, while preserving the bar once the electoral process begins.
At present, a single Delimitation Commission readjusts seat allocation and demarcates constituency boundaries for both the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. This centralised design has serious flaws.
Flaws in framework
First, although presented as a safeguard against political interference, the framework effectively privileges the party ruling at the Centre. Created by ordinary parliamentary law and shaped by Centre-dominated appointments, the Delimitation Commission reflects an era of one-party dominance, not today’s competitive, multi-party federal polity.
Second, it vests immense power in an unelected body whose decisions can reshape political representation across the Union and the States. This creates a dangerous single-point-of-failure risk if the commission is compromised.
Third, delimitation requires intimate knowledge of local realities: settlement patterns, transport links, natural barriers, administrative boundaries, and community relationships. Although State officers do much of the groundwork, final authority rests with a distant national body that may not adequately grasp each State’s complexities.
Finally, Speaker-nominated associate members, namely MPs and MLAs, may neither reflect the full political spectrum nor possess State-wide constituency knowledge, and without voting rights, they have no decisive voice in the process.
Experience under the 73rd and 74th Amendments strengthens the case for decentralisation. State Election Commissions already conduct the far more granular delimitation of panchayats, municipalities, and wards. The logical next step is to entrust Assembly delimitation to State Delimitation Commissions, leaving the Union Commission to delimit Lok Sabha constituencies.
Comparative practice also supports decentralisation. The US entrusts congressional and State districting to State-level institutions. Canada has separate federal commissions for each Province, while Provinces determine their own electoral boundaries. Australia keeps Commonwealth and State redistributions distinct. The UK has separate Boundary Commissions for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. These models recognise that electoral geography requires regional knowledge and institutionally proximate decision-making.
National Conference members protest the Delimitation Commission’s proposals, in Srinagar on January 1, 2022.
| Photo Credit:
S. Irfan/PTI
India’s Constituent Assembly considered this question but, in the conditions prevailing in the early republic, chose parliamentary control for reasons of uniformity and administrative convenience.
Committee recommendations
The Kurian Joseph Committee has recommended amending Articles 82, 170, and 327, Entry 72 of the Union List, and Entry 37 of the State List to create a Union Delimitation Commission for Lok Sabha delimitation and State Delimitation Commissions for Assembly delimitation. It has also recommended constitutionally entrenching the composition of these bodies and ending the present system of powerless associate members.
The Union Delimitation Commission may consist of a retired Supreme Court judge as Chairperson, a retired High Court judge, and the CEC ex officio. The judicial members should be chosen by a panel comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India. Six MPs—one each from the six largest parties in the Lok Sabha—should be full members with voting rights, ensuring real stakeholder participation.
Each State Delimitation Commission should be chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, with a retired High Court judge and the SEC as members.
Judicial members should be chosen by a panel comprising the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Six MLAs—one each from the six largest parties in the Assembly—should be full voting members.
Where there are fewer than six parties, the remaining seats may be allocated to existing parties in proportion to their Assembly strength, after reserving one seat for an independent MLA.
In short, the rule of law admits no islands of unaccountable power and delimitation is no exception. It must be independent, final, and protected from partisan capture but also be lawful, reasoned, and open to constitutional correction.
The path forward is accountable independence: legislative scrutiny, reasoned responses, limited pre-notification judicial review, separate Union and State Delimitation Commissions, constitutionally prescribed composition, and genuine multi-party participation with voting rights. A process that redraws democracy’s map cannot remain in a constitutional “black box”.
K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty is a retired IAS officer of the Tamil Nadu cadre, a former Vice Chancellor of the Indian Maritime University, Chennai, and Member of Tamil Nadu’s High-Level Committee on Union-State Relations.
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